

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		100-8684		
2	DDCI				
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4	D/ICS	DDS FOR ES		3/12/84	
5	DDI				
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9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
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12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
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15	D/OLL				
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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Executive Registry

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2 MAR 1984

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

February 22, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
 NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Subject: Chemical Weapons (CW) Ban

In light of Secretary Shultz's January 17 pledge regarding a draft CW treaty, we in ACDA have developed the attached plan of action and associated CW treaty texts for your consideration.

The proposed approach recognizes the need to proceed with great caution given Soviet non-compliance with other treaties and the severe problems of verifying key aspects of a total CW ban. We designed the approach to ensure that we have sufficient confidence about Soviet CW activities and stocks before undertaking any long-term or multilateral commitment. In this sense, it reflects Secretary Weinberger's concern that we not undertake such commitments until we have sufficient confidence in our knowledge and verification capabilities. By emphasizing the importance of US-Soviet bilaterals in this area and the importance of candid Allied consultations on verification problems, the approach also meets other concerns set forth in Secretary Weinberger's February 9 memoranda to Secretary Shultz and me.

Our proposal differs, however, from Secretary Weinberger's approach in that we would provide a draft treaty text. This is done to follow through on our announced intention to do so. That announcement was welcomed by our Allies; it is important that we follow through on this initiative.

The four-phased approach is as follows:

1. Negotiation of a bilateral treaty and initial information exchange with the Soviets, with submission of a draft multilateral text to the Conference on Disarmament this spring after consultations with Allies.
2. Conclusion of a bilateral agreement with the Soviets calling for detailed information exchange on all CW stocks and production facilities, a CW production moratorium for a year, and a strict verification regime including mandatory on-site inspections.

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3. If -- and only if -- we were entirely satisfied with Soviet implementation and the state of our knowledge after 6-12 months under the bilateral agreement, we would seek to conclude and join a multilateral treaty. This would, in the first instance, have essentially the same information exchange and verification measures as the bilateral treaty, but with a longer-term production ban.
4. The multilateral treaty would also provide that when we and other states were entirely satisfied with the declarations of stocks and facilities of all declaring states, we would undertake to destroy stocks and facilities over a 10-year period.

As noted, we would not go from one phase to the next under this approach unless we were satisfied with Soviet implementation. Some countries will try to push us ahead regardless, but we will need to remain firm on key elements.

Verification is, of course, a critical element. We all recognize the problems inherent in the fact that we presently have only very low confidence in our ability to detect undeclared stocks or facilities. It is also not clear that our capabilities can be improved significantly over time. This consideration has weighed heavily in designing our cautious phased approach. In particular, we would not proceed to the third or fourth phases unless we were comfortable with our ability to verify compliance.

In light of the above, I recommend that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs promptly provide guidance to ensure expeditious handling, and hope that we can reach agreement very soon. Early March would be a propitious time to move ahead in the Conference on Disarmament, as the week of March 12 has been set aside for CW discussions.



Kenneth L. Adelman

Attachments

- Tab A - Concept Paper w/Action Plan
- Tab B - Draft Bilateral Treaty
- Tab C - Draft Multilateral Treaty

cc: JCS, General Vessey
CIA, Honorable William J. Casey

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